GIMLI is a 384-bit permutation proposed by Bernstein et al. at CHES 2017. It is designed with the goal of achieving both high security and high performance across a wide range of hardware and software platforms.
INTRODUCTION
Permutations with large state sizes and desired cryptographic properties facilitate the construction of many cryptographic schemes, including high-security (tweakable) block ciphers, stream ciphers, message authentication codes, hash functions, etc. For example, the winner of the SHA-3 competition, Keccak hash function, uses a permutation operating on a 1600-bit state known as the Keccak-f permutation (Bertoni et al., 2013) . Also, we have message authentication code (Chaskey (Mouha et al., 2014) ), and stream cipher (Salsa20 (Bernstein, 2008) ) built on ARX permutations. However, existing designs suffer from the problem of showing significant performance variation when implemented in different platforms, severely limiting their range of applications. Therefore, a single primitive that performs well (not necessarily the best) on all common platforms will benefit the designers and implementors a lot.
With this goal in mind, Bernstein et al. presented the GIMLI design at CHES 2017 (Bernstein et al., 2017) . What distinguishes GIMLI from previous designs is that its performance strikes the balance across a wide spectrum of platforms by skillfully avoiding those platform-specific hazards leading to poor performance for many primitives simultaneously. Therefore, cryptographic schemes designed based on GIMLI are expected to be efficient when implemented on 64-bit Intel/AMD server CPUs, 32bit ARM smartphone CPUs, 32-bit ARM microcontrollers, 8-bit AVR microcontrollers, FPGAs, and ASICs with or without side-channel protections. We refer the reader to http://gimli.cr.yp.to for sample implementations and detailed benchmarks.
Given these merits of GIMLI, it has the potential to be employed in many future designs. Therefore, it is essential to have a thorough understanding of its security. Besides the initial cryptanalysis provided by the designers (Bernstein et al., 2017) , we are aware of only one third party cryptanalysis (Hamburg, 2017) . However, the claimed results of (Hamburg, 2017) is largely irrelevant to the original design, since the "attack" is against an artificial and ad-hoc mode (see http://gimli.cr.yp.to/statement.html for the statement from the GIMLI team). In this paper, we provide another third party cryptanalysis concerning Zero-Sum Distinguishers by using MILP, which has been used to automate many cryptanalytic techniques (Mouha et al., 2012; Sun et al., 2014; Xiang et al., 2016; Sasaki and Todo, 2017; Cui et al., 2016; Shi et al., 2018; Fu et al., 2016) . We identify a set of zero-sum distinguishers for 14-round GIMLI. To the best of our knowledge, these are the best distinguishers for GIMLI so far. to evaluate the algebraic degree of a boolean function with division property in Section 3, which is the main cryptanalytic tool employed in this work. The insideout technique for finding zero-sums is introduced in Section 4. In Section 5, we identify many zero-sum distinguishers of 14-round GIMLI with the methods presented in Section 3 and Section 4. We conclude in Section 6 and give some discussion of future work.
DESCRIPTION OF THE GIMLI PERMUTATION
GIMLI is a 384-bit permutation. There are 24 rounds in GIMLI, numbered 24,23, . . . , 1. The input 384-bit data is arranged into a 3 × 4 matrix of 32-bit words as shown in Fig. 1 . Let s i, j ∈ W denote the 32-bit word in row i and column j for 0 ≤ i < 3 and 0 ≤ j < 4, where W is the set of all 32-bit words (see Fig. 2 ).
The 384-bit state is then manipulated according to Algorithm 2 to produce the output. The inverse of the GIMLI permutation can be derived from Algorithm 1 and we put it into Appendix 6.
ALGEBRAIC DEGREE EVALUATION WITH DIVISION PROPERTY
The Division property, introduced by Todo at EU-ROCRYPT 2015 (Todo, 2015) , is a generalization of the integral property, and its bit-based version was applied in the cryptanalysis of SIMON at FSE 2016 (Todo and Morii, 2016) . Let F 2 denote the finite field of two elements, and Z represent the set of integers. The Hamming weight wt(v) of a vector v ∈ F n 2 is defined as the number of Algorithm 1: The GIMLI permutation.
Let f : F n 2 → F 2 be an n-variable boolean function whose Algebraic Normal Form (ANF) is
Definition 1 (Bit-based Division Property (Todo and Morii, 2016) ). Let X be a multiset whose elements belong to F n 2 . When the multiset X has the division
If a multiset X has division property D 1 n K , after the application of a vectorial boolean function F : F n 2 → F m 2 , the division property of the output multiset Y be-
Definition 2 (Division Trail (Xiang et al., 2016) ). Let F be the round function of an iterated block cipher. Assume that the input multi-set to the block cipher has initial division property D 1 n K 0 with K 0 = {k}. This initial division property propagates through the round function which forms a chain
For any vector k * i ∈ K i (i ≥ 1), there must exist a vector k * i−1 in K i−1 such that k * i−1 can propagate to k * i according to the rules of division property propagation. Furthermore, for (k 0 , k 1 , · · · , k r ) ∈ K 0 × K 1 × · · · × K r , if k i−1 can propagate to k i for all i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , r}, we call (k 0 , k 1 , · · · , k r ) an r-round division trail.
Given k and k , whether there is a division trail k → k for F can be determined by the resolution of a Mixed-Integer Linear Programming (MILP) model encoding the propagation rules of the division properties (Xiang et al., 2016) . We refer the reader to (Xiang et al., 2016) for more information on MILP-aided analysis of division properties.
Besides its natural application in finding integral distinguishers, it turns out that the division property can be a very generic tool for probing the structure of boolean functions whose explicit ANFs are not available due to resource limitation. In particular, the propagation of division properties can be used to evaluate the degree of a boolean function .
Lemma 1 (Todo, Isobe, Hao, and Meier (Todo et al., 2017) ). Let f : F n 2 → F 2 be a boolean function whose ANF coefficients are denoted by a f v (v ∈ F n 2 ), and k ∈ F n 2 . Then a f v = 0 for all v k if there is no division trail such that k f −→ 1.
Lemma 1 leads to the following two propositions for evaluating the degrees of (vectorial) boolean functions.
Proposition 1. Let f : F n 2 → F 2 be a boolean function. Then the degree of f is upper bounded by d + 1 where
Proposition 2. Let F : F n 2 → F n 2 be a vectorial boolean function. Then the degree of F is upper bounded by d + 1 where d = max k∈F n 2 {wt(k) : k F −→ e j is a division trail for some j ∈ {0, · · · , n − 1}} and e j is the jth unit vector. 
THE INSIDE-OUT TECHNIQUE FOR FINDING ZERO-SUM DISTINGUISHERS
The so-called zero-sum distinguisher was proposed by Aumasson and Meier in (Aumasson and Meier, 2009) , which can be regarded as a generalization of the integral property (a.k.a. saturation property) (Daemen et al., 1997; Knudsen and Wagner, 2002) . Definition 3 (Zero-Sum Distinguisher (Aumasson and Meier, 2009; Boura and Canteaut, 2010) ). Let F : F n 2 → F n 2 be a permutation. A zero-sum is a set
Since it is expected that a randomly chosen permutation does not have many zero-sums, the existence of many such sets of inputs can be seen as a distinguishing property of F.
The zero-sum distinguishers are intimately related to the integral distinguishers whose existence has a close connection with the degree of the underlying boolean functions.
Let I be a subset of {0, · · · , n − 1} with cardinality |I |, and δ(I ) be the subspace spanned by {e i : i ∈ I }.
For a vector a ∈ F n 2 , δ a (I ) is defined to be the set {x + a : x ∈ δ(I )}. That is, δ a (I ) is the set of all vectors whose values indexed by I traverse all possible values while the values at other positions are fixed to constants according to a. It is easy to check that for any a ∈ F n 2 , and any I whose cardinality is strictly greater than 1, ⊕ x∈δ a (I ) x ≡ 0. Moreover, if deg(F) < n, and |I | > deg(F), then for any a ∈ F n 2 , x∈δ a (I )
Therefore, many zero-sums δ a (I ) for F with deg(F) < n can be identified. Since F is a permutation, we can construct zero-sums from the middle (the inside-out technique (Aumasson and Meier, 2009; Boura and Canteaut, 2010) ) by exploiting the knowledge of the degrees of both the forward and backward directions of F as depicted in Fig. 3 . Firstly, F is decomposed into H • G, where G and H are n-bit permutations. Assuming that deg(G −1 ) < n and deg(H) < n, then for any a ∈ F n = 0 which indicates that G −1 (δ a (I )) is a zero-sum for F.
ZERO-SUM DISTINGUISHERS FOR ROUND-REDUCED GIMLI
To apply the inside-out technique, We split the 14round GIMLI into the first 5 rounds (denoted by G) and the last 9 rounds (denoted by H) as depicted in Fig. 4 . Then the degrees of G −1 and H are evaluated with the method introduced in Sect. 3. Therefore, we need to set up MILP models encoding the propagation of division properties for round-reduced GIMLI and its inverse. According to the specification of GIMLI presented in Algorithm 1 (also see Appendix 6 for its inverse), the MILP models can be constructed by properly assembling the MILP models for the following three operations.
Modeling S-box. We treat the non-linear operation (x , y , z ) = (y ∧ z, x ∨ z, x ∧ y) in GIMLI as a 3 × 3 Sbox, and use the method presented in (Boura and Canteaut, 2016) to retrieve its propagation rules (see Table 1 ) of the division property. Using the convex hull computation approach (Sun et al., 2014) , the propagation rule shown in Table 1 can be transformed into the following linear inequalities
where all variables involved are binaries. 
Input
Output (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 1) (0, 1, 0) (1, 0, 0) (0, 1, 0) (0, 0, 1) (1, 0, 0) (0, 1, 1) (1, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0) (0, 0, 1) (0, 1, 0) (1, 0, 1) (0, 1, 0) (1, 0, 1) (1, 1, 0) (0, 0, 1) (1, 1, 1) (1, 0, 1)
where all variables involved are binaries.
Modeling XOR. Let (a 0 , · · · , a m−1 ) XOR − −− → b be a division trail of XOR. Then a 0 + · · · + a m−1 = b, where all variables involved are binaries.
After assembling the above constraints for all operations involved in the underlying permutation, we can check whether d is an upper bound of the degree of the permutation as follows. We impose additional constraints dictating that
where u i 's and v i 's are the variables representing the input and output division properties, respectively (n = 384 for GIMLI). If the resulting model is infeasible, then the algebraic degree of the underlying permutation is upper bounded by d due to Proposition 2. Firstly, we evaluate the degree of H. Note that the degree evaluation of H has already been done by the design team. However, we still perform this process to verify our implementation against the results provided by the designers. The upper bounds of the degrees for round reduced versions of H (up to 9 rounds) are summarized in Table 2 , which match the results provided in (Bernstein et al., 2017) .
We then evaluate the degrees of round-reduced G −1 , and the results are listed in Table 3 . Note that the bounds we get are not necessarily tight. In our experiment, we observed that when we set the d in equation (1) to be a very small value, the resolution time of the MILP model can be very long. Therefore, we prefer to choose a d which may be much larger than the degree of the analyzed permutation.
According to the above results and the discussion of Sect. 4, We can conclude that G −1 (δ a (I )) with |I | > 350 is a zero-sum of 14-round GIMLI for any a ∈ F n 2 . Finally, we note that all models are solved by the Gurobi optimizer (Gurobi Optimization, 2013) and all experiments are performed on a com- 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In this work, by analyzing the degrees of roundreduced versions of the GIMLI permutation and its inverse, we obtained a set of 14-round zero-sum distinguishers, which achieves one-round improvement compared with the results offered by the designers. More specifically, the 14-round zero-sum distinguishers are constructed with the knowledge of the algebraic degree of the vectorial boolean function representing the output of 9-round GIMLI permutation and the upper bound of the degree of the inverse of 5round GIMLI permutation, where the evaluation of the algebraic degrees is performed by solving MILP models encoding the propagation of the division properties. Note that we are only able to get the upper bound of the algebraic degrees under our current computational resources. Therefore, it is interesting to investigate whether tighter bounds can be obtained. We expect that a more accurate degree evaluation may help to extend the zero-sum distinguisher one more round.
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